Huxberry · Internal · 22 August 2026

The Top Three, on Money

One page: what our product actually earns, and what each of the three viable locations does to that number. All figures from the verified data in the Evidence Report (§06b holds the methods). New to the analysis? Start with the three ideas in pictures.

Part 1 — The unit economics of our product

What a dirham of mattress sales earns

Measured on Huxberry's real buying prices — SpringTech's selling price to Huxberry Trading, validated line-by-line against the intercompany orders (99.2% of revenue costed). MEASURED

Factory SpringTech sells: 1,668 Our store Huxberry sells: 11,581 You store profit = 11,581 − 1,668 = 9,913
70.1%
Mattress gross margin (SZR store, 6 months)
53.5%
Beds & headboards gross margin
64.1%
Bedding & accessories gross margin (measured 22 Aug)
≈156k
AED/month — the "engine": mattresses + beds + bedding, after their ads
The monthly engine (SZR store, annualized from Feb–Aug 2026)AED / monthBasis
Mattress revenue~207,000MEASURED
− Cost of goods (transfer prices, 29.9%)−62,000MEASURED
= Mattress gross profit145,00070.1% margin
− Mattress advertising (Google + Meta, kitchens excluded)−25,000MEASURED range 17–30k by allocation
= Mattress contribution120,000
+ Beds & headboards gross profit+18,000MEASURED
+ Bedding & accessories contribution (pillows, protectors, toppers — 64.1% margin, after its ~2,000 of ads)+18,000MEASURED SZR share incl. half of unattributed online
= THE ENGINE — gross profit available each month≈156,000range ~145–165k

What fills the store: advertising, not the address

The result first: the location does not bring us customers. Advertising does.

In plain English: nobody buys a mattress because they happened to drive past a showroom. Our customers see the ads, research online, and then make a planned trip to the store — often from Arabian Ranches, Emirates Living, even Abu Dhabi. The ads create the visit; the store closes the sale.

How we know. This spring handed us an accidental experiment. In April the advertising was switched almost completely off — while the store sat on the same Sheikh Zayed Road frontage it has always had, with the same thousands of cars driving past every day. If passing traffic created customers, sales would have held up. They did not: sales stayed 60% down, and only recovered when the ads were switched back on in May and June — reaching the two best months of the year by July. And it is not just one month: across the whole year, sales rise and fall almost in lockstep with the ad budget (correlation r = 0.87). We even pay for footfall directly — about a third of the Google budget runs store-visit campaigns that generated ~26,000 "directions to store" clicks in a year. The ~25k/month of mattress advertising in the table above is part of the engine's cost for exactly this reason. MEASURED

What this means for rent: a location premium is money paid for drive-by visibility — and the data says drive-by visibility does not create demand. So every extra dirham of rent must justify itself as conversion (a better selling environment, cluster walk-ins, ticket uplift), never as advertising. That is the standard each option below is held to. ANALYSIS
Most months — adverts ON sales ≈ 650–880k ADS ON 📢 April — adverts nearly OFF same road · same cars · empty store sales 281k (−60%) ADS OFF

What the engine still has to pay — before any profit

OPEN ITEM — owner: Rajiv. The direct monthly running costs of the store — the team (manager, sales, support), deliveries & installation, payment fees, utilities — are deliberately not estimated here. These are numbers the business knows and this analysis should not invent. Once Rajiv provides the actual direct monthly cost, the exact net profitability of each option below is one subtraction away. Until then, every option is shown to the last measured line: gross profit after rent.

So the arithmetic every option must survive: ≈156k of monthly gross profit − rent − direct costs (open item) = net result. Whatever sofas and kitchens add comes on top — sofas demonstrably sell from Festival Plaza, and kitchens net of their required staffing is roughly zero today; bedding is now measured and inside the engine. The engine is the money; everything else is upside to be proven. ANALYSIS

This is also why the landlord's 2M renewal (167k/month) is eliminated before the shortlist: it exceeds the entire engine before one salary is paid. Full method, scenarios and caveats: Evidence Report §06b. Bedding notes: 100% of bedding revenue costed at transfer prices; ~20% rests on older transfer prices (no fresher exists in the ERP); AED 16.6k of mattress encasements stay counted under mattresses — nothing is double-counted.

Part 2 — The three options against the engine

Same engine, three different rents

Each case assumes the gross profitability above holds at the new address — that assumption itself is one of the "must be true" items.

88k
Al Joud — monthly profitability excl. direct costs (≈1.06M/yr)
77k
Eiffel @ written 950k — monthly profitability excl. direct costs (≈924k/yr)
45k
Umm Suqeim @ neg. 1.2M — monthly profitability excl. direct costs (≈540k/yr)

Same engine, same measurement — the only difference between the three numbers is rent. Rajiv's direct monthly cost then subtracts from each equally (Eiffel's compact team likely somewhat less).

Option 1 · ★ The recommendation — 8.5/10

Al Joud Centre — full-size on Sheikh Zayed Road

3,833 sq ft (combines to 7,000) · rent 680,000/yr + ~400,000 fit-out over 3 years = ≈68,000/month occupancy
🛏️ Mattress & bed revenue — MEASURED
Monthly revenue — mattresses ~207,000 + beds ~34,000≈241,000
− Cost of goods (SpringTech transfer prices)−78,000
= Gross profit (mattresses at 70.1%, beds at 53.5%)163,000
− Mattress advertising (Google + Meta, kitchens excluded)−25,000
+ Bedding & accessories contribution — 64.1% margin, measured (pillows, protectors, toppers)+18,000
= The engine — mattresses + beds + bedding, after advertising≈156,000
🛋️ Sofas — floor available in this store
The category currently sells ~55,000/month of revenue, keyed at Festival Plaza; what a display here adds is unmeasured+ $ TBD
− Sofa direct costs — none beyond the shared store team (sold by the same salespeople)≈ 0
🍳 Kitchens — conditional in this store
Requires combining to 7,000 sq ft AND the designer hires + factory capacity fix; net ≈ zero today without them+ $ TBD
− Kitchen direct costs — senior sales designer ~20,000 + support designer ~7,000/month + commission (Rajiv's figures, Principal's Review §C)−27,000
further discussion
Store total
= All categories together (kitchens net of their own designers)156,000 + $ TBD
− Occupancy−68,000
= PROFITABILITY EXCLUDING DIRECT MONTHLY COSTS — the last measured line88,000 / month (≈1,056,000 / yr) + $ TBD
− Direct monthly costs (store team, deliveries, fees) — TO BE ADDED · open item, Rajiv− ?
= Net profitability — computable the day the direct-cost number arrives?
🛏️ 🛋️ This store is for mattresses and sofas.🍳 Kitchens only by combining to 7,000 sq ft — and only with the hires and the capacity fix.

What must be true for Al Joud to be right

  • The fit-out quote lands near 400k and the 3-year amortization is acceptable (get the written quotation).
  • The unit passes the premium-read walkthrough — a set-back, mezzanine-heavy shell must be designable into a store worthy of the brand.
  • The engine survives the move — customers who bought at the current address keep coming ~1 km down the same road (adjacency to the zone retained; ads verified as the demand driver).
  • Kitchens enter only with the senior designer + support hire and a factory capacity fix — otherwise that floor goes to beds/bedding.
Character of the bet: the smallest one. Nothing extra has to go right for it to pay; everything extra (categories, growth, the 7,000 sq ft combination) is upside.
Option 2 · Runner-up, 7/10 — only at a written ≤950k

Eiffel 1 — compact flagship beside Hästens

2,400 sq ft, fully fitted · only at a WRITTEN ≤950,000/yr = ≈79,000/month (the listing's own lease terms say 1.2M = 100k/month, at which this case fails)
🛏️ Mattress & bed revenue — MEASURED
Monthly revenue — mattresses ~207,000 + beds ~34,000≈241,000
− Cost of goods (SpringTech transfer prices)−78,000
= Gross profit (mattresses at 70.1%, beds at 53.5%)163,000
− Mattress advertising (Google + Meta, kitchens excluded)−25,000
+ Bedding & accessories contribution — 64.1% margin, measured (pillows, protectors, toppers)+18,000
= The engine — mattresses + beds + bedding, after advertisingif it holds in half the space≈156,000
🛋️ Sofas — ✕ not in this store
No sofa floor — the category stays at Festival Plaza, where it demonstrably sells (~55,000/month revenue)
🍳 Kitchens — ✕ exited with this choice
The kitchens line (AED 1.06M/yr revenue) closes; its lead-gen ad budget is redeployed
Store total
= All categories together — complete; no further categories fit this store≈156,000
− Occupancy (no fit-out — fitted, opens fast)−79,000
= PROFITABILITY EXCLUDING DIRECT MONTHLY COSTS — the last measured line (11,000/month behind Al Joud, on the same engine)77,000 / month (≈924,000 / yr)
− Direct monthly costs (compact-format team, deliveries, fees) — TO BE ADDED · open item, Rajiv; likely lower than a full-size store's, which partly offsets the higher rent− ?
= Net profitability — computable the day the direct-cost number arrives?
Upside not counted: the premium-ticket thesis (SZR median ticket is 48% above DFP's) growing the engine; zero dark months+
🛏️ This store is for mattresses.🛋️ Sofas stay at Festival Plaza · 🍳 kitchens exit the business.

What must be true for Eiffel to be right

  • The 950k exists in writing. At the listed 1.2M the result turns to roughly breakeven-or-worse; this case is void without the signed counter.
  • The engine holds at 2,400 sq ft — mattress + bed sales density roughly doubles, with 14–16 beds displayed instead of a full range. This is the big untested assumption; even Hästens uses ~4,000 sq ft next door.
  • The SZR ticket premium is driven by the address and adjacency, not by the 5,000 sq ft assortment — the open question the data cannot yet split.
  • You accept no kitchens and no sofa business at the flagship (sofas live at Festival Plaza; kitchen ad budget gets redeployed) — a deliberate strategy choice, not a side effect.
Character of the bet: concentrated. If the premium-ticket thesis is right, this is the highest-margin store per square foot in the company; if the assortment was doing the work, the engine shrinks with the floor and the cushion is thin.
Option 3 · The conviction bet, 6/10 — pending site visit

Umm Suqeim Road frontage — full-size in the mattress cluster

5,138 sq ft · asking 1.5M → case shown at a negotiated 1.2M + fit-out = ≈111,000/month occupancy · listing must first survive a site visit (no building name, 2 photos, contradictory availability)
🛏️ Mattress & bed revenue — MEASURED
Monthly revenue — mattresses ~207,000 + beds ~34,000≈241,000
− Cost of goods (SpringTech transfer prices)−78,000
= Gross profit (mattresses at 70.1%, beds at 53.5%)163,000
− Mattress advertising (Google + Meta, kitchens excluded)−25,000
+ Bedding & accessories contribution — 64.1% margin, measured (pillows, protectors, toppers)+18,000
= The engine — mattresses + beds + bedding, after advertising≈156,000
🛋️ Sofas — dedicated floor in this store
The category currently sells ~55,000/month of revenue, keyed at Festival Plaza; what dedicated floor here adds is unmeasured+ $ TBD
− Sofa direct costs — none beyond the shared store team (sold by the same salespeople)≈ 0
🍳 Kitchens — dedicated floor in this store
Possible with the designer hires + factory capacity fix; net ≈ zero today without them+ $ TBD
− Kitchen direct costs — senior sales designer ~20,000 + support designer ~7,000/month + commission (Rajiv's figures, Principal's Review §C)−27,000
further discussion
Store total
= All categories together (kitchens net of their own designers) — the extra floor must clear ~59,000/month (Part 2b)156,000 + $ TBD
− Occupancy−111,000
= PROFITABILITY EXCLUDING DIRECT MONTHLY COSTS — the last measured line45,000 / month (≈540,000 / yr) + $ TBD
− Direct monthly costs (full-size team, deliveries, fees) — TO BE ADDED · open item, Rajiv; broadly the same bill as Al Joud's, since both are full-size stores− ?
= Net profitability — computable the day the direct-cost number arrives?
The measured gap that needs no estimate: this option starts 43,000/month behind Al Joud on identical direct costs — pure rent difference. The category stack (bedding, sofas, kitchens net of staffing, cluster walk-ins) must close that gap before it adds anything−43,000 vs Option 1
🛏️ 🛋️ 🍳 This store is for mattresses, sofas and kitchens — the full-range store.The extra categories must together clear ~59,000/month (Part 2b).

What must be true for Umm Suqeim frontage to be right

  • The unit is real and right: the site visit verifies frontage, building quality and September availability, and the rent actually negotiates from 1.5M to ~1.2M.
  • The multi-category model performs: bedding margin (unmeasured today), sofas on display, and kitchens — properly staffed and with factory capacity — together contribute ≥ ~0.5–0.8M/yr. This option is a bet on the full range, priced accordingly.
  • The cluster effect is real: being beside The Mattress Store, MEROË and The Bedroom captures comparison shoppers other brands' marketing brings to the street.
  • The destination/assortment thesis holds — the 5,000 sq ft experience is what earns the premium ticket, and it travels to a corridor address.
Character of the bet: the biggest store and the biggest claim on the engine. It is the right choice only as a conviction bet on the full-range destination strategy — the engine alone cannot pay its rent.
Part 2b · The space-for-products correction

Charging big stores full rent against a small store's products is unfair — here is the corrected lens

The tables above load each option's entire rent onto the same mattress-and-beds engine. That is conservative, but asymmetric: the larger stores' extra floor exists to sell more products, which the engine number gives them no credit for. The fair split: the engine needs only ~2,400 sq ft to run (the compact format proves it), so charge the engine that much floor at each option's rate — and treat the remaining floor as its own mini business case: its share of rent is the monthly hurdle its extra products must clear. ANALYSIS

OptionAll-in rate AED/sq ft/yrEngine floor cost (2,400 sq ft)Engine profitability on its own floorExtra floorHurdle: what the extra products must earn
Al Joud (3,833 sq ft)212−42,000/mo114,000/mo1,433 sq ft25,000/mo
Umm Suqeim frontage (5,138 sq ft @ neg. 1.2M)260−52,000/mo104,000/mo2,738 sq ft59,000/mo
Eiffel (2,400 sq ft @ written 950k)396−79,000/mo77,000/monone— (no room for more products)
  • Al Joud gets stronger: best engine economics under either lens, and its extra 1,433 sq ft needs to earn only ~25,000/month from sofa display or a compact kitchen (bedding already counts inside the engine) — a modest bar.
  • Umm Suqeim looks far better than the whole-store view suggested — 86,000/month on its engine floor, not 27,000. The real question is now precise: can 2,738 sq ft of sofas + kitchens (properly staffed) clear 59,000/month? That is the number the category stack must beat — bedding now counts inside the engine, sofas sell ~55,000/month of revenue today from Festival Plaza, and kitchens net of staffing is ~zero, so it is a bet, with a defined price.
  • Eiffel is unchanged but exposed: it pays the highest rate for every engine square foot (396 vs 212–260) and has no room to add products. Its entire case is that the address and Hästens adjacency lift the engine by more than the rent premium — the untested premium-ticket thesis.
  • Simplifications, stated: the 2,400 sq ft engine-floor figure is the compact format's proven need; splitting rent pro-rata by area ignores that frontage floor is worth more than back floor; direct monthly costs remain the open item for Rajiv either way.

Benchmarking against Eiffel — assign the mattress division 77,000/month everywhere

The model: the mattress division's contribution (≈156,000/month) travels with the business, not the building. Fix its assigned profit at Eiffel's 77,000/month — then the division can fund up to 79,000/month of rent wherever it sits. Whatever rent remains, plus the other divisions' own direct costs, is the profitability the remaining square footage must deliver. ANALYSIS

Al Joud (3,833 sq ft) Mattress shop 2,400 sq ft pays ALL the rent +11,000 spare Extra room 1,433 sq ft rides free ✓ extra rooms must earn: 0 Umm Suqeim (5,138 sq ft) Mattress shop 2,400 sq ft pays its share Extra rooms 2,738 sq ft sofas + kitchens must pay their way extra rooms must earn: 32,000 / month
OptionOccupancy /moRent left after the mattress division's 79,000Direct costs of those divisionsRequired monthly profitability from the remaining sq ft
Eiffel @ written 950k79,0000— no remaining floor; this is the baseline
Al Joud (1,433 sq ft remaining)68,000−11,000 (over-covered)Kitchens −27,000 (further discussion) only if activated; sofas ≈ 0Zero. The mattress division alone covers the whole rent with 11,000 spare. Sofas at zero still beat the Eiffel bar; kitchens need only self-fund their own 27,000
Umm Suqeim frontage (2,738 sq ft remaining)111,00032,000Kitchens −27,000 (further discussion) if activated; sofas ≈ 032,000/mo net of divisional costs. Sofas-only: ≥32,000 of gross profit ≈ ~50,000/month of sofa revenue at the measured 64.6% sofa margin — roughly what Festival Plaza already sells. With kitchens activated: sofas + kitchens gross profit ≥ 59,000/mo (32,000 + the 27,000 designers)

Two asymmetries to hold alongside this: Eiffel's 77,000 assumes the engine survives in half the space — the untested bet the bigger stores don't carry; and Eiffel's compact team likely costs less to run, which would shift the bar somewhat — Rajiv's direct-cost sheet settles that.

The bottom line: Al Joud wins on measured money under every lens — 88k/month before direct costs, and it beats the Eiffel bar with its extra floor earning nothing. Eiffel is viable only at a written 950k, and only if a half-size store keeps full-size mattress sales. Umm Suqeim must first pass a site visit, then sell a Festival-Plaza's-worth of sofas just to tie the other two. Three ground checks — the Al Joud fit-out quote and walkthrough, the written Eiffel counter, the Umm Suqeim site visit — settle all of it in days. ANALYSIS